February 7, 2025, is just three weeks away. For the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), the signatories and non-signatories of the April 3 Accord, the Haitian population, and international partners, a countdown will begin. The lack of significant progress in achieving the transition’s objectives—security, a national conference, a referendum, and general elections—will become undeniable. A reckoning of the CPT’s use of time is inevitable: time spent maneuvering, ousting a prime minister, appointing another more amenable one; the disgraceful time wasted on schemes that undermine credibility; and the time spent tolerating council members accused of corruption. The likely end of placating gestures will bring forth a fundamental question: Will the CPT, the Fils-Aimé government, and the CEP be capable of ensuring the security, political, and technical conditions needed to hold a referendum and general elections within the next 10 to 12 months, enabling a transfer of power to elected, legitimate authorities by February 7, 2026?

The current security conditions necessary for elections in the most populous departments—West and Artibonite—are non-existent in January 2025. Open conflicts persist between the CPT and stakeholders who appointed its members, some of whom have denounced the CPT’s actions as a coup against the April 3 Accord. Political actors accuse certain officials of exploiting their positions for electoral advantage. Rival factions, such as Lavalas and PHTK, remain at odds, while Tet Kale members dream of a resurgence through support within the Trump administration. Between Lavalas and the Republicans, there has never been any harmony. Haiti is once again trapped in a binary of the worst. It is increasingly difficult to overlook the outcomes of Lavalas and PHTK’s respective tenures, which have dominated the political scene for decades. As every day of 2025 counts, every wasted day will bring closer the realization of failure—failure of individuals, the transitional structure, and its very formula. The unresolved conflicts stemming from the perceived coup against the April 3 Accord will likely complicate future political agreements. Extending the mandate of the current leadership or introducing a new transitional formula will be fraught with challenges. Unless there is a major shift, few are likely to rally to save the CPT.