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Opinions

When the Accountability is Used as a Political Tool in Haiti

JE
Jean Eddy Amajuste Citoyen, Haitien

November 17, 2026 · Lecture : 4 min

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La Cour Supérieure des Comptes et des Contentieux administratifs
La Cour Supérieure des Comptes et des Contentieux administratifs
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Originally designed as a bulwark against corruption and a guarantor of good governance, the accountability of public funds has, over the decades, become one of the most controversial mechanisms in Haitian institutional life. Provided for by the 1987 Constitution, this formality originally requires any manager of public funds to account for their management before being able to run for an elective office. However, in practice, this principle of accountability has transformed into a formidable weapon of deterrence and political elimination.

Confusion between technical control and political decision-making

In public law, a fundamental distinction exists between public accountants and budgetary authorities, such as ministers or general directors, who authorize expenditures. While the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) is tasked with auditing accounts and issuing discharge certificates to accountants, Article 233 of the Constitution entrusts Parliament with the prerogative to pronounce on ministers' management and grant discharge. It is precisely within this institutional architecture that the trap lies. Placing the civic future of former leaders in the hands of a political assembly — Parliament — thus opens the door to partisan settling of scores. Instead of rigorously relying on the technical reports of the CSCCA, parliamentary commissions make the granting or blocking of discharge a bargaining chip.

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The case of the late Gérald Mathurin, former Minister of Agriculture, a prime example of political instrumentalization of accountability

When Parliament is functional, the political instrumentalization of accountability occurs mainly through two mechanisms: deliberate blockage and calendar arbitrariness. To sideline an opponent as an election deadline approaches, it often suffices for the elected officials to let their file languish in the drawers of a bicameral commission. Without a vote, there is no approval or official rejection, but the result is relentless: the former official finds themselves hit by a genuine “everything is tight,” unable to submit their candidacy to the Electoral Council (the case of former Minister Mathurin). The former Minister of Agriculture from March 1996 to October 1997, Mr. Mathurin had his candidacy rejected twice due to accountability issues, even though the Southeast would be almost unanimous in electing the agronomist engineer Mathurin for the 2015 senatorial elections or for the renewal of a third of the Senate. Knowing the rigor of Mr. Mathurin, who knows how beneficial his contribution would be and would probably spare us so much uncertainty and setbacks. It wasn't until July 5, 2021, a day before the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, that a posthumous discharge of his management was granted to him (without the slightest verification or additional technical report), thus allowing his heirs to dispose of his assets.

Conversely, discharge is sometimes granted with motivated speed to allies of the power, or even circumvented by exceptional presidential decrees when Parliament is dysfunctional. This false semblance of accountability at multiple speeds undermines the credibility of public financial oversight. The discharge, instead of certifying the honesty and transparency of a manager, measures their proximity or opposition to the current power. The recent statements from the CSCCA affirming that in a constitutional logic, it is up to Parliament to grant discharges to budget authorities is exactly what the late Professor Monferrier Dorval called the theory of impossible formalities. If this is the case, the transitional government can also postpone elections on the grounds that organizing elections is constitutionally a prerogative of the President of the Republic. Managing in a situation of institutional void requires informed decisions, certainly anchored in legal-institutional grounds since ultimately the aim should be to avoid the absence or weakness of institutions turning into a collapse of the State.

Towards a Necessary Depoliticization of Accountability

As the saying goes, “you eat the elephant one bite at a time.” As long as the discharge procedure remains a tool of selective sorting between allies and political opponents, it will continue to fuel post-electoral tensions, undermine institutional stability and contribute to the paralysis of the public administration. This instrumentalization also discourages many competent professionals from putting their expertise at the service of the State, for fear of being exposed to more political than technical sanctions.

Restoring the discharge to its original purpose today requires a reform based on rigorous legal clarification or simply opting for a system based on continuous accountability mechanisms (the case of Quebec, for example). This procedure must be absolutely removed from partisan contingencies to become a strictly judicial, technical and impartial mechanism, framed by clear and binding legal and regulatory deadlines. Only at this price will accountability cease to be a political guillotine and become a tool for strengthening Haitian democracy.

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